It’s those pesky assumptions again. And these particular assumptions come with downsides that make the catastrophic meetup of the Titanic and Mr. Iceberg look like a birthday party with ice cream, cake, and pink unicorn frosting.
Recently the Center for Strategic & International Studiesran a series of wargames on the issue of a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan. A total of 24 iterations were played, three with a “base scenario,” and the rest with various pessimistic or optimistic assumptions that it was assumed would alter to some extent the outcomes of the base scenario. The report on these games was just released by the think tank. You can read (or download) the entire piece here: The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan.
The report opens with some extended throat-clearing involving the reasons for this particular war game series, considerable discussion as to the means and methods used to construct the various scenarios, and justifications for the individual iterations. Of particular interest, and importance, are the limitations deliberately placed on the game in order to accommodate the stated goals of the exercise.
The Challenge
China’s leaders have become increasingly strident about unifying Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).1
Senior U.S. officials and civilian experts alike have expressed concern about Chinese intentions and the possibility of conflict. Although Chinese plans are unclear, a military invasion is not out of the question and would constitute China’s most dangerous solution to its “Taiwan problem”; it has therefore justly become a focus of U.S. national security discourse.
Because “a Taiwan contingency is the pacing scenario” for the U.S. military, it is critical to have a shared, rigorous, and transparent understanding of the operational dynamics of such an invasion.
Just as such an understanding was developed concerning the Cold War’s Fulda Gap, so too must analysts consider the Taiwan invasion scenario. This understanding is important because U.S. policy would be radically different if the defense were hopeless than if successful defense were achievable.
If Taiwan can defend itself from China without U.S. assistance, then there is no reason to tailor U.S. strategy to such a contingency. At the other extreme, if no amount of U.S. assistance can save Taiwan from a Chinese invasion, then the United States should not mount a quixotic effort to defend the island.
However, if U.S. intervention can thwart an invasion under certain conditions and by relying on certain key capabilities, then U.S. policy should be shaped accordingly. In this way, China would also be more likely to be deterred from an invasion in the first place. However, such shaping of U.S. strategy requires policymakers to have a shared understanding of the problem.
Yet, there is no rigorous, open-source analysis of the operational dynamics and outcomes of an invasion despite its critical nature. Previous unclassified analyses either focus on one aspect of an invasion, are not rigorously structured, or do not focus on military operations. Classified wargames are not transparent to the public. Without a suitable analysis, public debate will remain unanchored. Therefore, this CSIS project designed a wargame using historical data and operations research to model a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan in 2026.
In short, CSIS facilitated this war game to provide policy makers with the means to tailor strategy based on a rational understanding of what the likely, or at least possible, outcomes of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be. That’s why it didn’t attempt to model other potential circumstances like blockades, cyber attacks, internal subversion, or other possible vectors of Chinese attempts to bring Taiwan to heel.
Btw, jargon like “pacing scenario” is not particularly intended to enlighten those not in on the jargon (internal jargon, sometimes called “cant,” is one way insiders identify themselves to each other), but SecDef Lloyd Austin provides an explanation.
Austin has described China as America's pacing threat, and the undersecretary spelled out what this means to members of the DOD. "It means that China is the only country that can pose a systemic challenge to the United States in the sense of challenging us, economically, technologically, politically and militarily," he said.
So, how seriously should we take these war-gamers at CSIS? It depends. While in their report they seem to have been quite transparent about their methodologies and decision-making processes, they still ended up with an outcome that, first, would be reasonably pleasing to any policymakers seeking reassurance that Taiwan could be successfully “defended,” (more on that later) and second, an outcome seemingly at odds with every other recent wargaming effort (that we know about) on the issue. For instance:
A brutal loss in a wargaming exercise last October convinced the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. John Hyten to scrap joint warfighting concepts that had guided U.S. military operations for decades.
“Without overstating the issue, it failed miserably. An aggressive red team that had been studying the United States for the last 20 years just ran rings around us. They knew exactly what we're going to do before we did it,” Hyten told an audience Monday at the launch of the Emerging Technologies Institute, an effort by the National Defense Industrial Association industry group to speed military modernization.
The Pentagon would not provide the name of the wargame, which was classified, but a defense official said one of the scenarios revolved around a battle for Taiwan. One key lesson: gathering ships, aircraft, and other forces to concentrate and reinforce each other’s combat power also made them sitting ducks.
“We always aggregate to fight, and aggregate to survive. But in today’s world, with hypersonic missiles, with significant long-range fires coming at us from all domains, if you're aggregated and everybody knows where you are, you're vulnerable,” Hyten said.
Even more critically, the blue team lost access to its networks almost immediately.
“We basically attempted an information-dominance structure, where information was ubiquitous to our forces. Just like it was in the first Gulf War, just like it has been for the last 20 years, just like everybody in the world, including China and Russia, have watched us do for the last 30 years,” Hyten said. “Well, what happens if right from the beginning that information is not available? And that’s the big problem that we faced.”
The October exercise was a test for a new Joint Warfighting Concept. But the new joint concept had been largely based on the same joint operations concepts that had guided forces for decades, Hyten said, and the red team easily defeated them.
This game was played in October of 2020, a bit more than two years ago. It is somewhat difficult to accept that we would progress from “miserable failure” to a somewhat Pyrrhic victory over that time period, given that Chinese military capabilities have been growing, while our military seems more concerned with pronouns, female bathrooms for biological males, and integrating women into infantry battle units.
There is also these sense in some quarters that CSIS may exemplify a certain agenda.
John Kempthorne wrote in Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting that CSIS was "heavily funded by the US government, arms dealers and oil companies, [and] is a consistently pro-war think tank".[61]
And while this may be little more than the lefty pot calling the neocon kettle black, a quick glance at the names associated over the years could certainly give one pause.
Anyway, take all that for whatever you think it’s worth. Let’s take a look at the game itself. We’ll begin with the four iterations of the base scenario.
Based on interviews and a literature review, the project posited a “base scenario” that incorporated the most likely values for key assumptions. The project team ran that base scenario three times.
The invasion always starts the same way: an opening bombardment destroys most of Taiwan’s navy and air force in the first hours of hostilities. Augmented by a powerful rocket force, the Chinese navy encircles Taiwan and interdicts any attempts to get ships and aircraft to the besieged island. Tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers cross the strait in a mix of military amphibious craft and civilian roll-on, roll-off ships, while air assault and airborne troops land behind the beachheads.
Results
This chapter describes the results of the iterations. They are grouped in five categories of scenarios: base, pessimistic, optimistic, “Taiwan stands alone,” and “Ragnarok” (highly pessimistic). The overall finding is that China is unlikely to succeed in an invasion of Taiwan in 2026 if four conditions hold.
1. Taiwan must vigorously resist. If it does not, the rest is futile.
2. The United States must join hostilities within days and with the full range of its capabilities. Delays and half measures make the defense harder, increase U.S. casualties, and raise the risk of the Chinese creating an irreducible lodgment on Taiwan.
3. The United States must have use of its bases in Japan. Without them, the United States cannot use its numerous fighter/attack aircraft.
4. Finally, the United States must possess enough air-launched, long-range ASCMs.
I can think of a few more.
China must not be able to deploy land-based hypersonic-capable ballistic anti-ship missiles with sufficient range to kill U.S. surface naval assets beyond their offensive bubbles. In other words, Chinese weaponry can strike US assets while the US is unable to reach China/Taiwan with its own fires.
I expect the assumption will turn out to be faulty. So, by the way, do the CSIS wargamers, who find the U.S. losing a minimum of two aircraft carriers in just about every iteration they run. Where our assumptions differ is their belief that only two carriers do the Titanic dive - except for the “Ragnarok” scenario, where the Chinese sink four carriers. But if China has the missiles to kill all of them that enter their missiles’ protection bubble, I can see no reason why they would not use them to do so.
NEW YORK – A March 8 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on China’s naval capabilities cites the view of top US commanders that China’s arsenal of anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) can hit moving targets, effectively closing an area a thousand miles from China’s coast to the American Navy.
The report states: “A December 3, 2020, press report stated that Admiral Philip Davidson, the commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, ‘confirmed, for the first time from the US government side, that China’s People’s Liberation Army has successfully tested an anti-ship ballistic missile against a moving ship.’ China reportedly is also developing hypersonic glide vehicles that, if incorporated into Chinese ASBMs, could make Chinese ASBMs more difficult to intercept.”
Some of the assessments by senior US flag officers have been cited before, but the CRS report gives them additional weight in the context of an overall assessment of Chinese capabilities.
If Chinese missiles can effectively clear the coast of American vessels to a distance of 1,500 kilometers or more, the United States has no effective way of defending Taiwan against a prospective Chinese armed landing.
The intermediate-range DF-21 missile has a reported range of 1,500 kilometers and the DF-26 long-range missile can reach targets 4,000 kilometers away.
America’s airbase on the island of Guam is 3,000 kilometers from China’s coast, well within the range of the DF-26. The US base at Kadena, “the only major US airbase within unrefueled range of the Taiwan Strait” according to a RAND Corporation report, is 816 kilometers from Shanghai, well within the range of Chinese intermediate-range missiles.
American warships have anti-missile systems including the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, which can fire interceptor missiles to destroy incoming threats. But existing American systems can be swamped by missile barrages that can overwhelm defenses. No existing anti-missile system, moreover, is equipped to defend against hypersonic glide vehicles.
China must not be able to neutralize Japan so as to prevent the deployment of Japanese military assets, as well as deny the use of Japanese airfields to the U.S.
I wouldn’t bet the house, wife, and kids on that one, either. The gamers did come close to that in one scenario, where Japan stayed neutral, but did allow U.S. aerial assets to operate from their own bases on the island.
BASE SCENARIO
Design: The project team conducted three iterations of the base scenario (using only base case assumptions without any of the excursion cases described in Chapter 4). Operational Outcomes: Two out of three of these iterations were decided quickly, with the Chinese forces ashore unable to capture major cities and out of supplies within 10 days. In one iteration, PLA forces landed in the south and captured the port at Tainan. However, U.S. air strikes prevented its use, and the Chinese position was untenable by D plus 21. This was the only iteration of the base scenario that was not judged to be a decisive Chinese defeat, instead scoring as “Stalemate, trending against China.” In all cases, at least 90 percent of the Chinese amphibious fleet was destroyed, leaving the forces ashore supported only by air drops and heliborne supplies.
Losses: Balanced against Chinese failure to achieve operational objectives in the base scenario were the large losses suffered by all the combatants. Considering the short period of time, U.S. air losses were greater than any witnessed since the Vietnam War. Naval losses were greater than anything experienced since World War II. Japan also suffered heavily: two out of the three base iterations saw strikes against airfields across the length of the archipelago. Taiwanese losses in personnel and infrastructural damage were great. China’s losses were also staggering and included large numbers of aircraft, virtually its entire fleet, and thousands of personnel. Although losses were high for both sides, the speed with which the base scenario ends (often decided by the sinking of China’s amphibious fleet after 10 days) limits losses in the ground campaign for both sides.
The relative strength of U.S. and Chinese air-to-air capability was unimportant because most aircraft were destroyed on the ground. The lack of U.S. and allied air bases within practical range of Taiwan led to crowding at the few bases available. Furthermore, most of those bases lack any HASs to mitigate damage. Thus, Chinese missiles destroyed many aircraft—about 90 percent of total U.S., Japanese, and Taiwanese losses—on the ground, despite the large number of U.S. and Japanese air and missile defenses on Okinawa.
The United States lost between 168 and 372 aircraft in the three base scenario iterations. Subtracting the 96 Navy fighter/attack aircraft lost on U.S. aircraft carriers in all base scenario iterations, the Air Force suffered losses between 70 and 274 aircraft, mostly on the ground.
In one of the base scenario iterations, the Chinese team did not attack bases in Japan, but China did strike Andersen Air Force Base in Guam in every iteration, producing losses there. Japanese air losses were also high in two out of three iterations, averaging 122 aircraft, and were also largely incurred on the ground.
In all iterations of the base scenario, U.S. Navy losses included two U.S. aircraft carriers [!!! - ed.] as well as between 7 and 20 other major surface warships (e.g., destroyers and cruisers).
These losses were partly an artifact of U.S. forward deployment aimed at deterring China, as the scenario begins with two carriers and an additional SAG positioned in vulnerable positions off Okinawa. It also reflects the vulnerability of surface ships to large salvos of modern anti-ship missiles. These salvos exhausted the ships’ magazines of interceptors; even with the base case assumption that shipborne missile defense works very well, there are simply too many attacking missiles to intercept.
The JMSDF suffered even more heavily, as all its assets fall within the range of Chinese anti-ship missile systems, which include anti-ship ballistic missiles and long-range ASCMs as well as submarines and shorter-range munitions.
Suffice to say that all of the iterations almost always ended with an American victory, albeit an incredibly costly one that leaves the people of Taiwan dying en masse in a nightmare hellscape without electricity and all the subsequent horrors that implies in terms of food, water, shelter, clothing, health, and so on.
Let’s take a look at Ragnarok, though.
Ragnarok Design:
The “Ragnarok” scenario was designed to ascertain what conditions would be necessary for China to be victorious in the face of Taiwanese resistance and U.S. intervention. The need for a special scenario became clear after China failed to secure a total victory in a range of pessimistic scenarios. This scenario should therefore not be taken as a likely future but rather as a tool to illustrate what would be necessary to invalidate the project’s main result (that China is unlikely to succeed if Taiwan resists and the United States intervenes).
To be victorious, China must negate U.S. airpower, both fighter attack and bombers. U.S. fighter/attack aircraft could not effectively participate in operations if Tokyo remained strictly neutral and did not allow the United States to operate from its bases in Japan. While it is possible to use tankers with aircraft based on Guam, this would (1) be vulnerable on the ground to Chinese ballistic missiles, (2) be vulnerable in the air if tankers were intercepted, and (3) be unable to generate enough sorties over Taiwan to significantly affect the battle. Second, China would need to negate U.S. bombers. This is hard to do because bombers can be based beyond the range of most Chinese ground-attack missiles, approach the theater from several angles, and launch standoff missiles beyond the range of defending SAMs. If China attempted to interdict U.S. bombers with its surface ships, then the United States could attrite these ships down until it had created a path to the amphibious fleet (not unlike most other scenarios, wherein the United States must attrite the pickets east of Taiwan). An extreme-range SAM would be limited by the curvature of the Earth and therefore be unable to intercept U.S. bombers before they fired their missiles.
However, without U.S. fighters based in Japan for escorts, U.S. bombers would be vulnerable to Chinese fighters armed with extreme-range air-to-air missiles. Alternatively, if China either did not have these missiles or could not complete a kill chain with them, the United States could negate its own bombers by failing to procure sufficient long-range, air-launched ASCMs.
Operational Outcomes: As expected, Ragnarok ended in a PLA victory. Without having to worry about U.S. forces in Japan, the PLA was able to focus its land-attack missiles on Guam, negating it as a factor in the conflict.
Despite the absence of U.S. bombers, the Chinese amphibious fleet still took a large number of casualties from ASCMs on Taiwan and U.S. SSNs infiltrating into the straits. By the time these attackers were out of ammunition or attrited, they had reduced the amphibious fleet to one-third of its beginning strength. However, the absence of U.S. fighter/attack aircraft allowed the Chinese to focus their aircraft on supporting the ground invasion. This allowed the PLA to make steady progress ashore and eventually compensate for destroyed amphibious ships with captured ports and airports.
The last serious challenge to the invasion came from an unsuccessful attack by the massed U.S. fleet. After three weeks of conflict, a U.S. fleet of 29 cruisers and destroyers, two carriers, and 10 SSNs approached Taiwan. Under withering fire from Chinese submarines, air-launched ASCMs, and surface ships, the US fleet was largely destroyed without relieving Taiwan. At this point, the game was called.
Losses: Casualties in this scenario were very different from other scenarios. The only U.S. aircraft that were destroyed were either on Guam initially or flew from carriers. The reliance on SSNs meant that 10 SSNs were lost even before the climactic naval showdown. In total, the United States lost four carriers, 43 cruisers and destroyers, and 15 SSNs. If Taiwan continued to fight to the end, their casualties would be similar to those in the “Taiwan stands alone” scenario.
Critical Variables: This scenario demonstrated the centrality of two variables: basing in Japan and the ability of the United States to deliver ASCMs en masse. Without the ability of U.S. aircraft to operate out of Japan, the PLAAF can concentrate against targets in Taiwan while the PLA delivers more troops ashore. While U.S. bombers could hypothetically still deliver a decisive amount of ordnance, the outcome would rest on their effectiveness. This could be neutralized either by PLA advances in anti-air missiles or by insufficient stockpiles of standoff anti-ship missiles. Without U.S. airpower, Taiwanese ground-launched ASCMs and U.S. SSNs are insufficient to defeat a Chinese invasion; furthermore, the vulnerability of surface ships prevents the U.S. surface fleet from being effective. While it must be emphasized that this was an unlikely scenario, it is analytically helpful.
This should give you a decent overview of the wargame itself, and the various outcomes, based on a range of assumptions, that resulted. In Part Two, which I intend to publish next Monday, January 23, 2023, we’ll take a look at the validity of the assumptions that were used, as well as discuss the implications of the results the CSIS game came up with.
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All this is sound and fury signifying nothing if Taiwan has a handful of nuclear weapons. I personally believe this is why the CCP has not moved to date. They are perfectly capable of visualizing Shanghai and the Three Gorges Dam disappearing in bright flashes along with more than 100M Chinese. In support of that notion I note that the two partners South Africa had in its (successful) nuclear weapons program were Israel... and Taiwan. That was four decades ago. Does anyone think that the Taiwanese today don't have that capability?
As an aside, I do believe the CCP will embark on a military adventure in the next year or so but the target will be Vietnam, not Taiwan. The installation of a CCP puppet government in Vietnam would staunch the loss of manufacturing from the CCP to Vietnam, provide coastal ports all along the South China Sea. bring the CCP navy much closer to the Singapore Straits and generally influence all of Southeast Asia in their direction. Also, neither the US, Australia, Japan, Taiwan nor South Korea could or would do much to help. A supply effort ala what the West has done with Ukraine would run afoul of a CCP declared exclusion zone. Would it be successful? I don't know, but it would be easier and with more strategic benefit to the CCP than inheriting an ruined Taiwan.
All this is sound and fury signifying nothing if Taiwan has a handful of nuclear weapons. I personally believe this is why the CCP has not moved to date. They are perfectly capable of visualizing Shanghai and the Three Gorges Dam disappearing in bright flashes along with more than 100M Chinese. In support of that notion I note that the two partners South Africa had in its (successful) nuclear weapons program were Israel... and Taiwan. That was four decades ago. Does anyone think that the Taiwanese today don't have that capability?
As an aside, I do believe the CCP will embark on a military adventure in the next year or so but the target will be Vietnam, not Taiwan. The installation of a CCP puppet government in Vietnam would staunch the loss of manufacturing from the CCP to Vietnam, provide coastal ports all along the South China Sea. bring the CCP navy much closer to the Singapore Straits and generally influence all of Southeast Asia in their direction. Also, neither the US, Australia, Japan, Taiwan nor South Korea could or would do much to help. A supply effort ala what the West has done with Ukraine would run afoul of a CCP declared exclusion zone. Would it be successful? I don't know, but it would be easier and with more strategic benefit to the CCP than inheriting an ruined Taiwan.